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Donald Westing 
Moral Sentiment from Adam Smith to Robert Bums 
Reconstructing from the 199Os, I shall attempt to think back from the 1780s 
to attach Robert Bums's moral premises to a line of Scottish Enlightenment phi-
losophy. I say attach to and not derive from, because along the way I will argue 
that in the famous Kilmarnock volume (Poems, Chiefly in the Scottish Dialect, 
1786) Bums wrenches and exceeds the Francis Hutcheson-David Hume-Adam 
Smith philosophy of approbation, or judgment of the propriety of passions, where 
the moral agent is seen by the eyes of the community. After 1789 and the events 
in France, Bums enters the insurrectionary politics of a new era, though more 
obliquely and hesitatingly than the unknown William Blake and the infamous 
Thomas Paine. Now, say in 1795 when Bums versifies Paine in 'The rank is but 
the guinea's stamp, / The Man's the gowd for a' that,"} he is more concerned 
with exposing the inequities of rank in his Scottish community than with defin-
ing-also aggressively defying-a reputation as a man of correct and modest 
virtue. By the end of this essay I come round, if like Bums only partially, to Ro-
manticism. Like his near-contemporary Blake, Bums in his poetry is the culmi-
nation, and surpassing, of certain eighteenth century traditions. Neo-classical 
satirists and Romantic singing bards: Blake and Bums are transitionally both, but 
also neither because their satire is no longer Augustan, and their songs are not yet 
individualized as lyrical ballads. 
1 "For a' that and a' that" in Poems and Songs of Robert Burns, ed. James Kinsley. 3 yols. 
(Oxford, 1968). II, 762. Henceforth Poems. 
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The starting point is the double question David Craig asked in Scottish Lit-
erature and the Scottish People, 1660-1830: 
Why was it. .. that the expression of Scottish socialness was carried on so exclusively 
by the vernacular writers? why did the communications represented by the national po-
etry stay so insulated from the more refined manners and ideas which the educated 
classes were learning from France and England?,,2 
I have no wish to challenge Craig's splendid evidences from Scots poetry, a 
"distinctively native mode of expression [which] held together through several 
generations" (p. 20) and culminated in Bums, but I would make the suggestion 
that Bums lived out his Scottish socialness in and through moral categories he 
learnt, assuredly, from Calvinist religion-but also (here is where I claim a mod-
est originality) from Scottish philosophers. That is, Bums is the linking figure 
between the Scottish people and the educated classes, and he works out the 
linkage through his distorting reference to certain categories of the system of 
approbation-disapprobation, principally self-control, sympathy, generosity, and 
remorse. The linkage is one-way, from Bums to educated Glasgow and Edin-
burgh, because the philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment do not mention 
poetry; and because the Edinburgh people who become or pose as his patrons, 
after his trip there in 1786, usually make a myt;h of what he is about. 
Bums may not have read every page of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, published in the year of Bums's birth, but one page obviously caught 
his passionate attention in 1783. We do not know why Bums identified with just 
this passage in Smith, but he did; it was not until later that he committed the deed 
that provoked condemnation by many members of his community? Bums en-
tered in his commonplace book two long sentences where he said "I entirely 
agree with that judicious philosopher, Mr Smith," and then he wrote a short, 
rather horribly conventional blank verse poem about the embittering sentiment of 
remorse.4 His views, in the poem and related prose, entirely follow Smith's Sec-
tion II, Chapter 2, "Of the Sense of Justice, of Remorse, and of the consciousness 
of Merit," on the painfulness and sense of social isolation of remorse, where our 
l David Craig, Scottish Literature and the Scottish People, 1660-1830 (London, 1961), p. 20. 
30n May 22, 1785, Burns's daughter Elizabeth (his "dear-bought Bess") Paton was born, but 
it was not until June 25, \786, that he appeared before the Kirk Session and then made the re-
quired appearances before his congregation for the sin of fornication with Jean Armour. On 
Burns's behalf it should be recalled that his offer of marriage was refused by Jean's father. It was 
not at all uncommon among the peasantry of eighteenth-century Scotland for a couple to delay 
marriage until pregnancy occurred. 
4The sentences on Smith, from the First Commonplace Book, are printed as a headnote to 
"Remorse" (Poems, I, 37). 
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guilt is deepened by the knowledge that our crime has ruined another person, and 
where we learn the need, in Bums's phrasing, for "a proper penitential sense of 
our misconduct" and "a glorious effort of Self-command" (Poems, I, 37). Bums 
appears to have been bowled over by the second-last paragraph of Smith's chap-
ter, where Smith gives a splendid moral-psychological account of the stages of 
remorse in the violator, who is self-banished from society and then ricochets 
back from solitude into the "presence of mankind" to beg protection from the 
judges who have condemned him. The poem's reference to the torment of a 
"burning Hell" seems to be Bums's own ima§;e, but he takes directly from Smith 
the sense that remorse is the "most dreadful" of sentiments, that it comes from 
involving innocent others in folly, that the terror of punishment needs to be met 
by penance and firm resolve-what Bums in the last line of the poem calls 
"magnanimity of sou!." I mention this explicit Bums-Smith connection, in a 
poem Bums himself did not print and whose merit is only as a symptom, because 
we can generate from the terms in this poem what is most important of Smith's 
moral system; then we can show how in the Kilmarnock volume Bums uses 
Smith's categories to judge himself and those who would judge him. 
Remorse is not simple regret, but more like shame and guilt in its acceptance 
of responsibility for injuries to others. Remorse is directed inward, because one 
holds oneself to blame; it would seem, though neither Smith nor Bums says this, 
a self-indulgent sentiment, wherein the human agent is more concerned with its 
esteem in its own eyes than with the victims of its folly. Remorse wards off cen-
sure from others by first inflicting it upon oneself; such dramas of self-interest 
are typical of Bums, as we shall see. 
In the paragraph just following where Adam Smith offers his disturbing de-
scription of remorse, the philosopher examines how the "opposite behavior"-
that is, generosity-"naturally inspires the opposite sentiment" (Smith, p. 85). 
Performing a generous action, giving to another rather than taking, is worthy of 
the approbation of an impartial judge, and the generous person is "secure that he 
has rendered himself worthy of [the] most favorable regards" of all mankind 
(Smith, p. 85). Generosity is not antagonistic to self-love, if we wish to inspire in 
others, about ourselves, the sentiments of approbation or gratitude, or if we wish 
to avoid blame, censure, or punishment. Of all human virtues, generosity is most 
useful to other persons. The tenderness of humanity is the virtue of a woman, 
Smith unkindly says (Smith, pp. 190-91), while generosity is the virtue of a man 
who has greater self-denial, self-command, and a fuller sense of propriety. Gen-
erosity, magnanimity, and justice command a high degree of admiration (Smith, 
p. 167). In allowing magnanimity to decline into a general sense of benevolence, 
we have perhaps lost the full urgent Enlightenment concern for the dignity of one 
who can learn from the community's disapprobation, and wisely judge how and 
.I Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments. cd. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie 
(Oxford, 1976), p. 85. Henceforth Smith. 
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when to despise an advantage. Justice is the most useful to society of all these 
virtues. Smith says, "though it may be awkward and pedantic to affect too strict 
an adherence to the common rules of prudence or generosity, there is no pedantry 
in sticking fast to the rules of justice" (Smith, p. 175); this because justice main-
tains the integrity of the social rules themselves in their general applicability to 
all persons. 
Those are some leading value-terms of Smith's system, categories he shares 
with his Scottish predecessors in the philosophy of approbation, Hutcheson and 
Hume. Earlier than Smith, Hume in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of 
Morals (1751), had held that "virtue is whatever mental action or quality gives to 
a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation"-and vice the contrary;6 both 
Hume and Smith determine moral approbation by qualities as they are agreeable 
to others, and both make fellow-feeling, or sentiment or sympathy, a main con-
stituent of their moral philosophy. Smith's originality involves developing the 
system of regard, amplifying the relationships of the sentiments, emphasizing the 
mediating role of sympathy for others as we calculate our position in relation to 
them, and notably theorizing the role of a real or imaginary impartial spectator-
whose opinion we might take as standing for the community'S. Believing that 
self-control is the capability around which all the other passions gravitate, Hume 
and Smith are moral conservatives who applaud cool behavior, even as they 
elaborate a theory of the passions; for them humans can be purposive and rational 
in their emotional lives. 
Why bother to outline this classification of the passions? It is always of 
value to inquire how subjectivity is fitted into discourse, and Hume and Smith 
are distinguished contributors to a European problematic that is part of the fate of 
feeling in the West. ill the 1980s, Alasdair Macilltyre in After Virtue (1981, 
1984) rejected the Enlightenment project of Hume and Smith because of the dis-
appearance, there, "of any connection between the precepts of morality and the 
facts of human nature," and the inadequacy of their notion of sympathy as a 
philosophical fiction to bridge the logical gap? ill Winter 1996, New Literary 
History built a whole issue around a programmatic essay by Tzvetan Todorov, 
who takes Smith with Rousseau and Hegel as the great Western philosophers of 
the social dimension of our experience.8 Todorov defends moral recognition, in 
the eyes of the community, against what he calls the "self-mutilating" (p. 14) 
monotony of current scholarship's obsession with a conflict over power. So 
Smith ha<; not been forgotten in serious recent work. Still, the mapping of the 
6David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), ed. J. B. Schnee-
wind (Indianapolis, 1983), p. 85. 
7 Alastair MacIntyre. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, 1984). p. 56 
(quotation). p. 49 (on inadequacy of sympathy). 
STzvetan Todorov, "Living Alone Together," New Literary History, 27 (Winter 1996), 1-14. 
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relationships of the passions is a frankly archaic side of Smith's book, and my 
purpose in returning to it is not to denounce or promote Smith but to show a pat-
tern of behavior in Bums's Poems, Chiefly in the Scottish Dialect. 
This great book opens with an abject Preface, and ends with the imagined 
epitaph of a poet, entirely Adam-Smithian in its invocation of fellow-feeling, 
denunciation of unchastity, and la'lt-stanza hope for the italics-emphasized qual-
ity of "self-controur' (Poems, I, 247). The contents of this book, between these 
wobbling-tone brackets, often lead us to think that Burns is a combustible person 
who would say anything. There is the element of danger and instability. From 
Smith, Burns apparently drew reinforcement for his impulses to self-command. 
and permission for his impulses to sympathy. His book contains many magnifi-
cent peaks of sentiment, profound and quotable, such as lines that are straight out 
of Smith though strikingly transformed by context: 
o wad some Pow'r the giftie gie us 
To see oursels as others see us! 
("To a Louse"; Poems, I, 194. Italics are Burns's) 
Who else but Burns would have seen that, and who else could have used it for a 
distinctively Scottish socialness? 
The person who lacks it most, most eagerly supplicates self-control. Burns 
in his 1783 poem "Remorse," worried about his reputation, has already the de-
veloped anxiety that will persist to his dying words-on how his character will 
be attacked as soon as he dies. It is this anxiety of being in the eyes of the com-
munity that predisposes Bums to the moral philosophy of Smith, where he sees 
his weakness chastised and also his possible redemption through self-command. 
His weakness, he well knows, is for the most part a specifically sexual emotional 
volatility, what he calls the "softer flame" in the last-page "Bard's Epitaph" of 
the Kilmarnoek volume (Poems, I, 247). Like David Hume, who in one of his 
essays declared that the "affection of gallantry is natural in the highest de-
gree .... as generous as it is natural,,,9 Burns wa'l more apt than Smith was, or than 
we are, to forgive and wish forgiven sexual follies and crimes. 
Carol McGuirk puts the general point well when she affirms that "to be can-
did, even feckless, in one's emotional responses was central to Burns's idea of 
being heroically human."w She thinks Burns, in his inability to pin down a sta-
ble identity, is like James Boswell, that wavering Scot who needing something 
obdurate cultivated in Samuel Johnson a model and interlocutor of supreme 
definiteness--except that Burns had no Johnson. Burns, says McGuirk, exposes 
his "vast social unease" (see pp. 86-8) in his letters, not in his poems, which after 
9David Hume, "Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences," in Essays: Moral. 
Political and Literary (Oxford, 1963). pp. 132-3. 
IOCarol McGuirk, Robert Burns and the Sentimental Era (Athens, GA. 1985), p. 129. 
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all are very secure and subtle in their presentation of character-types and in their 
firm familiar sense of who may be the addressee of the utterance. I would extend 
the "vast social unease" to the poems, and will argue that Burns's Lowland, la-
borer-farmer experiences of class and gender, mediated through moral categories 
he partly learned from Smith, permeate the Kilmarnock volume as well. The 
unease is no place more evident than in the structure of experience I have already 
called "warding-off." In "Remorse," Burns inflicted punishment on himself in 
order to duck the disapprobation of his community; in the satirical and familiar-
epistle poems of the later 1780s, where misanthropy is the polar opposite of 
sympathy, he excoriates others, including others not known to him personally, 
like King George III. The person who craves self-control most eagerly identifies 
the want or excess of self-control in others; those vulnerable to censure, censure 
first. In many of the poems of the 1780s, within and without the 1786 volume, 
Burns is the virtuoso of the preemptive insult. 
Bums had twenty years as a writer. He began writing songs at 16 under the 
combined incentive, he said, of love for a girl and competition with the poem-
writing son of a laird. He worked largely as a satirist and familiar-epistle poet to 
the age of twenty-seven, when his breakthrough to publishing and to Edinburgh 
high society, in 1786, put him in touch with the wider intellectual community in 
Scotland. Then he spent the decade to his death working largely as a writer and 
re-writer of Scottish songs. The songs Burns arrives at, or ends with, effortlessly 
find a language anterior to anxiety of class and masculine desire, and previous to 
propriety, esteem, and the regard of community. Those like David Craig and 
Angus Calder, who would connect Burns to the Scottish folk tradition through 
the songs, are perhaps the critics least likely to see Burns's linkage with the 
other, educated tradition through the language of approbation in satires and epis-
tles. 11 To study the language of approbation, we must focus on the work other 
than songs. We should remember that contest with the laird's son, whose deep 
meaning I interpret as inaugurating the intention of literature, which hoists Burns 
from his social and moral milieu, puts him into articulate conflict with the 
mono\ogic Calvinists of Ayr and Irvine, obliges him to read Adam Smith and 
identify himself in a paragraph on remorse, obliges him to read Milton and iden-
tify with Satan's magnanimity, and puts him into a passive-aggressive struggle 
with the dying institution of patronage. 
There are four places to look for the structure of moral sentiment in Bums. 
First, a conspectus of many of the issues concerning Burns in the eye of the 
community comes from 'The Brigs of Ayr" (1786), where the poem as a whole 
sets the bridges arguing in their own voices, the new against the old, a forensic 
debate of eras that is possible to orchestrate because it is in the first instance rag-
ing in Burns's own mind. Part of the author's self-assignment here is to work 
IIFor David Craig, see Note 2; for Angus Calder, see his "Descriptive Model of Scottish 
Culture,"2, I (l995),1-14,esp. p.lO. 
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through the problem of gaining a patron, here John Ballantine to whom the poem 
is dedicated, without becoming a sycophant. The poem opens with self-naming 
as a "simple Bard," a frequent awkward propitiatory rhetoric in Bums, with pos-
sibilities for taunting, as to say, I'm "rough at the rustic plough" (Poems, I, 280), 
but see what such a one can write! 
Second, if a Calvinist humanism related to honest labor and individual free-
dom surfaces in Bums's thought after 1789, as Liam Mcllvanney argued in His-
tory Workshop Joumal,12 a conventional Calvinism is earlier evident in his many 
references to the devil. Through these references, religion is both respected and 
taunted; religion needs to be attended to in order to be corrected. There is not 
only the famous "Address to the Deil" in the Kilmarnock volume, but also the 
violently sarcastic "Address of Beelzebub" where in his own voice the devil 
urges further excesses of Scottish aristocrats, as they ruin the lives of working 
people. There are many other references to the devil, mostly in passing like the 
"Poor devil" who is forced to eat a French ragout instead of a proper sheep's 
stomach in "To a Haggis." These devils are treated humorously, but Beelzebub 
gets some good lines, and there are enough devils in varied contexts to suggest 
the poet fears and admires the energy in Satan's challenge to authority. Even in 
rejecting the devil, Bums is talking to or as the devil, skirting the darkness. The 
devil may, in Bums's reading of Milton, have magnanimity and self-control, but 
assuredly Satan lacks sympathy, generosity, gratitude, fellow-feeling, justice and 
all other virtues. Speculatively and ironically, to talk to or as the devil tries out a 
denial of the moral sentiments of Adam Smith, the Scottish Enlightenment, and 
the religious leaders of the day. 
Third, the meeting place of established religion, personal sexual error, and 
poetry is always a place of anxiety where the theory of moral sentiments is bru-
tally tested. Here is the second stanza of "A Poet's Welcome to his love-begot-
ten Daughter": 
Tho' now they ca' me, Fornicator, 
And tease my name in kintra clatter, 
The mair they talk, I'm kend the better; 
E'en let them clash! 
An auld wife's tongue's a feckless matter 
To gie ane fash (Poems, I, 99). 
The poem is tender toward the daughter ("fatherly I kiss and daut thee") and an-
grily articulate against the priests who condemn the poet; Bums will tum the dis-
approbation into approbation by transposing it to a literary context: blame is 
fame. Smith, who is a stickler for chastity, would not approve, but Bums is im-
provising on-tauntIng-the notions he has inherited of the mode of regard. As 
12Liam McIlvanney, "Robert Burns and the Calvinist Radical Tradition," History Workshop 
Journal, 40 (1995), 133-49. 
154 Donald Wesling 
a poem containing the same elements but with a radically different logic and 
tone, I would point to Bums's "Address to the Unco Guid, or the Rigidly Right-
eous" where after baiting his accusers he ends by asking that they "gently scan": 
ask motives, ask about remorse, wonder to what extent any of us may judge a 
sovereign other: 
Then at the balance let's be mute, 
We never can adjust it; 
What's dane we partly may compute, 
But know not what's resisted (Poems, I, 54), 
Besides being exact as prosody and tight as logic, this is an appeal to the moral 
calculus, and takes ethical questions to the edge of religious faith. "Unco Guid" 
begins as preemptive insult and ends, unpredictably, in an urgent morality inhab-
ited by Soren Kierkegaard, not Adam Smith. 
Finally, the generation after 1780 was the last generation of literary patron-
age-that scheme of rewards where social and literary approbation are knit to-
gether. The practice became unworkable when, increasingly, the booksellers' 
market took over. Signs of breakdown of this practice are allover Bums's work; 
one who believes "the Man's the gowd" cannot help mocking the part of himself 
that wants to be patronized, given praise, and given a job in the Excise. "A 
Dedication to G.H. Esq.," from the Kilmamock volume, is a letter poem in cou-
plets where Bums swears he will engage in no bowing, flattering, and begging, 
but by denying this he has raised the thought. Then he ends by imagining Gavin 
Hamilton (G.H. of the title, his rich letter-receiver) is broke, "as poor a dog as I 
am" (Poems, I, 246): the least convenient argument if he wishes to get Hamil-
ton's financial help. The other outrageous example of a patronage poem off the 
rails is "A Dream," also from the 1786 volume, a birthday poem in fifteen stan-
zas for (and spoken to) George m. This is often dismissed by critics in a sen-
tence or two, but it is a very impressive social poem-in fact, to my mind the 
greatest poem of lese majeste in any language. Not only must the King of Great 
Britain listen to 135 lines in Scots dialect; the King must also have rehearsed for 
him his loss of the American colonies and his inability to control his own family. 
Speaker and addressee are on one level, in a calculated insulting familiarity. Per-
haps here, in poems about patronage that diminish his possible patrons, Bums 
most exceeds the confines of Adam Smith's elaborate scheme of approbation-
disapprobation. 
Smith followed Moral Sentiments with his far more influential master-work 
The Wealth of Nations in 1776; here, leaving moral sentiments behind to study 
capitalist markets, he inquired into the economic motives for human actions. 
Later in 1790, the year of his death, he published a revision of Sentiments with 
additional materials in Part VI, section ii (2.12-18), where he registered his shock 
at civil faction in the French Revolution-the overthrow of a whole social order 
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based on what were for Smith merely abstract ideas. 13 This thoroughly Edmund-
Burkean position in 1790 casts a light back on a limitation that was always there 
in the Sentiments, namely a tendency for the economically secure person to as-
sume that the manners and institutions of society are appropriate to the deepest 
needs of all persons. Smith, with his settled belief in rank, overlooks the ques-
tions of inequality that torment Bums, and in this respect, however haltingly, 
Bums makes the tum to Romanticism and modem society while Smith does not. 
Approbation is in the eye of the community, but who is the community? 
Bums forces the question; Smith need not. The community of Scottish social-
ness is not the implicit order of Smith. Rank is not of the essence but ornamen-
tal: "The rank is but the guinea's stamp" ("Song-For a' that and a' that," 
Poems, II, 762). Bums, it seems, found a slippage at the center of Smith's phi-
losophy, but he did not point it out or make the issues explicit. In the 1780s he 
worked it out in satires and epistles, anxiously exceeding Smith's sympathy with 
his misanthropy. In the 1790s he worked it out in a few lyrics about brotherhood, 
like "For a' that and a' that," exceeding Smith's sympathy with his radical idea of 
equality. Earlier I touched on Alasdair MacIntyre's complaint that no one at the 
time understood the failure of Enlightenment moral philosophy, its separation of 
conduct from religion. But if my argument is correct, at least one Scots contem-
porary of Smith in part understood this failure: Robert Bums. 
University of California, San Diego 
13Raphaei and Macfie discuss Smith's late revisions in response to the events in France in 
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